Sudan war: Why Hemedti’s legitimacy push in Uganda falters amid RSF atrocities
Sudan War: Why Hemedti’s Legitimacy Push in Uganda Faces Challenges Amid RSF Atrocities
On February 20, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader known as Hemedti, made an appearance in Kampala, Uganda, during a meeting with President Yoweri Museveni. This marked his most prominent diplomatic activity outside Sudan in recent months.
The visit occurred just a day after a UN probe identified the RSF as responsible for genocide in Darfur. It followed the U.S. imposition of sanctions on three RSF commanders for their roles in atrocities in el-Fasher. International criticism of the RSF’s actions has persisted, with a December 2023 U.S. ruling classifying its conduct in Darfur as ethnic cleansing. Throughout 2024, the UN Security Council has also seen multiple briefings and resolutions addressing these concerns.
Hemedti did not arrive in Uganda unaccompanied. He was joined by individuals tied to the parallel political framework he helped establish in Nairobi—often called “Tasis.” This initiative aimed to present RSF-controlled regions as civilian-administered alternatives to state authority. Despite its intent, Tasis failed to gain significant political backing and was widely rejected by governments, regional groups, and international institutions, including the UN.
Sudan’s Government Condemns Uganda’s Role
Sudan’s ruling authorities criticized Uganda for hosting Hemedti, viewing the gesture as a slight to the Sudanese people and a broader challenge to global narratives on the conflict. This implies that Kampala’s engagement with Hemedti extends beyond a mere courtesy. It reflects a strategic move to reposition the RSF as a credible political force in the region.
Currently, the RSF manages administrative control in areas under its influence while backing alternative governance systems. This development raises questions about Sudan’s potential for de facto division. The timing of the Uganda visit suggests a calculated effort to shift the RSF’s public image and expand its influence beyond Sudan’s borders.
Strategic Ambitions and Rhetorical Moves
Hemedti’s speech in Kampala highlighted themes of national cohesion, resistance to division, and openness to civilian-led political processes. He framed the conflict as a battle against entrenched Islamist groups, positioning himself as a key player in Sudan’s future. The claim that RSF fighters now number over 500,000 is designed to bolster domestic support and signal readiness for broader political involvement.
“The Rift Valley Institute notes that by engaging Hemedti publicly, Museveni enters a precarious balancing act.”
This dual approach aims to both reinforce internal authority and enhance the RSF’s regional standing. Yet, the contradiction remains stark: a paramilitary commander accused of widespread abuses promotes democratic ideals while leading an independent political structure outside formal state institutions.
Uganda’s choice to host Hemedti aligns with its long-standing role as a proponent of “African solutions to African problems.” Its neutral position in the Horn of Africa and East African diplomatic arenas makes it an ideal partner for the RSF. By welcoming Hemedti, Kampala gains a platform to engage with Sudan’s conflict without being tied to a single faction. This also distances Uganda from the Nairobi-based Tasis initiative, which struggled to gain traction.
The visit indirectly supports broader mediation efforts involving the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad). However, it also exposes Museveni to scrutiny, as his support for the RSF could undermine his reputation as a mediator of African unity. The RSF’s push for legitimacy hinges on this delicate balance between military dominance and political outreach.
